Also, see identical ruling, Federal District Court, Texas, 1969: (Calbillo v. San Jancinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857, cause remanded 434 F. 2d. 609, appeal after remand 446 F. 2d. 887).
Federal Court of Appeals, Florida, 1972: Hostile audience is not basis for restraining otherwise legal first amendment activity. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Collie v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F. 2d. 746).
Federal Court of Appeals, Florida, 1974: Public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because ideas are themselves of offensive to some of their hearers. West's F.S.A. 877.03; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F. 2d. 303).
Federal Court of Appeals, Indiana, 1974: Freedom of expression (does not mean freedom to express only approved ideas; it means freedom to express any idea. (Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 499 F. 2d. 797).
Federal Court of Appeals, District of Colubia, 1977: The Constitution mandates that access to the streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places for purpose of exercising first amendment rights cannot be denied broadly and absolutely. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Washington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane, 566 F. 2d. 107, 184 U. S. App. D. C. 215).
United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin, April 30, 1970: An ordinance that proscribes conduct that tends to "disturb or annoy others" is both vague and overbroad. I he constitutionally protected exercise of free expression frequently causes a disturbance, for the very purpose of the first amendment is to stimulate the creation and communication of new, and therefore, often controversial ideas. The prohibition against conduct that tends to disturb another would literally make it a crime to deliver an unpopular speech that resulted in a "disturbance." Such a restriction is a clearly invalid restriction of constitutionally protected free expression. (Gardner v. Ceci, 312 F. Supp. 516/ see also Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, N.D. 111. 1968).
Federal District Court, Tennessee, 1978: The fact that persons might express their religious views at some place other than the public streets, sidewalks, and other areas of the city does not have any consequence in determining the validity of permit requirements with respect to the use of such public areas. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Smith v. City of Manchester, 460 F. Supp. 30).
Federal Court of Appeals, Virginia, 1982: Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on free expression and their enforcement cannot he based on content of speech thereby restricted.
A compelling governmental interest unrelated to speech must he served by restriction on speech.
Ordinance containing restrictions on free expression must be drawn with narrow specificity to be no more restrictive than necessary to secure such interest.
Adequate alternative channels of communication must be left open by restrictions on free expression. Davenport v. City of Alexandria, Virginia, 683 F. 2d. 853, on rehearing 710 F. 2d. 148. Also, see Salahuddin v. Carlson, 523 F. Supp. 314.).
Federal Court of Appeals, Virginia, 1973: The first amendment protects from state interference the expression in a public place of the unpopular as well as the popular and the right to assemble peaceably in a public place in the interest and furtherance of the unpopular as well as the popular. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F. 2d. 1010).
Federal Court uf Appeals, Virginia, 1972: Government may not favor one religion over another. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (U.S. v. Crowthers, 456 F. 2d. 1074).
U.S., Arkansas, 1968: The freedom of religion provision of the first amendment forhids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of a theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma. The state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Epperson v. State of Arkansas, 89 S. Ct. 266).
Federal Court of Appeals, Texas, 1972: "Controversy" is never sufficient in and of itself to stifle the views of any citizen. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. I (Shanlcy v. Northeast Independent School Dist., Bexar County, Texas, 462 F. 2d. 960).
U.S, California, 1971: As a general matter, the establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherence of any sect or religious organization. U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. I (Negre v. Larsen, 91 S. Ct. 828).
PASSING TRACTS IS LEGAL
Chief Justice Hughes, U.S. Supreme Court, held; (Lovell vs. City of Griffen, Ga., Vol. 58, #12, 4/15/38) "The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. Liberty of circulation is as essential to the freedom as liberty of publishing. Indeed, without circulation, the publication would be of little value."
Similarly, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Black, in 1943 decided: "We think the judgment (against two tract distributors) must be reversed because the Dallas ordinance denies the appellant (the wrongfully accused woman) the freedom of press and religion guaranteed to her by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution...One who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there, as elsewhere, the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature, as well as the spoken word."
LOUD SPEAKERS PERMITTED
The U.S. Supreme Court, 6/7/48, "Saia vs. NY." Legalized use of loud speakers in public places. Cities may, by local ordinances, control excessive noise, and time and place (public places like parks should be left open) but cannot ban loudspeakers, or censor "annoying ideas." This is your constitutional right, and the Supreme Court said that no local police should make persons lose time in court to prove a right which is already theirs.
STREET MEETINGS: NO PERMIT NEEDED ACCORDING TO U.S. SUPREME COURT
Justice Roberts, U.S. Supreme Court, in Nov. 1939 decided: "The freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the U.S. is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One, against abridgment by a state. Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare, or convenience.
These may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print, or circulate information or opinions. We hold a municipality cannot require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval." Justice Black in 1946, also similarly held these rights also extend to company owned towns and Federal Villages.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas on 7/22/48 held that "subjecting the right to hold street meetings to the discretion of city officials, or the payment of a fee, interfered with the constitutional rights of free speech and free assembly."
Amendment 1 (Adopted 1791)
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Amendment 14 Section 1 (Adopted 1868)
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any persons of life, liberty, property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.