Natural Law and Moral Relativism
Kenneth Cauthen
The essay that was originally on this page was published as
part of a chapter in my The Ethics of Belief: A Bio-Historical
Approach,
2 vols. (Lima, OH: CSS Publishing Co., 2001). Any permission to use this material must come from CSS Publishing Co.
The natural law tradition has a long and distinguished history.
Its main virtue lies in the quest for objectivity and universality in
ethical theory. Its primary limitation is that any statement of natural
law is relative to the time, place, culture, and outlook of its
formulators. Hence, the quest for objectivity and universality is
called into question. Despite this, merit attaches to the effort to
seek agreement about moral norms based on principles that are
potentially available to all rational inquirers. The appeal to reason
rather than to traditions peculiar to particular cultures or religions
is the basis of its enduring appeal. Yet reason is not the impartial
"spectator of all time and existence" (Plato) but the instrument of
finite reasoners whose insights are shaped by the specific intellectual
resources available to them in their culture and their own inventory of
rational tools. No supreme court is available to adjudicate contrary
interpretations, since any arbiter to whom appeal might be made or who
claims superior wisdom is subject to the same limitations as the
original disputants. All reason is historical -- the instrument of
time- and culture-bound communities and individuals.
The liabilities of natural law theory are well-known. First of all,
natural law has been claimed in the past as the justification for
practices that nearly everyone now recognizes as evil. Slavery and the
denial of the right to vote to women are obvious examples. In the
second place, competent interpreters in the past and present have
disagreed about what natural law mandates. A century and a half ago
slaveholders and abolitionists alike claimed natural law as the basis
of their contrary claims. Today a dispute rages about whether same-sex
love is morally offensive because it is "unnatural." If the content of
natural law changes as previous claims are abandoned in favor of new
ones and if competent interpreters of natural law then and now are in
disagreement about what it obligates us to approve, then what becomes
of the objectivity and universality that are alleged to be its
principle strengths? If we recognize that great minds have been
egregiously wrong about the principles of natural law in the past, what
gives us confidence that our present readings that seem so convincing
to us are right? Serious moralists, of course, have some limited
ability to recognize their own bias and self-interest. Honest seekers
of truth can to some extent transcend their own parochialism in quest
of a more impartial outlook but not in such a way as to overcome the
fundamental relativity that makes it impossible to rise above the
resources available to us at a given time and cultural location.
Natural law has no advantage that is not obtained by the simple claim
that we affirm and commit ourselves to act upon the best we know up to
now from all sources. Moreover, we seek the agreement of other
morally-serious agents in support of the principles and norms that
command our allegiance. We remain in conversation with those who oppose
us and stay open to further insight as a consequence of this
engagement. The content of belief and the agreement that can be secured
with others is the crucial point. It is not essential to get agreement
that our convictions are reports of discoveries we have made by
examining reality itself. It is useful, however, for all parties to
state the reasons for believing what they do and to recite the history
and the experience that led to these convictions and to the inescapable
and undeniable status they now have in their minds and hearts -- at
least for now. We can engage each other as historical beings whose
beliefs are relative to our time and place and confess to each other
how and why we came to believe as we do while being open to learn and
to change as the consequence of our encounters. But we add nothing to
content or to commitment by arguing over whether we ought to base our
convictions on natural law.
It is, of course, legitimate and helpful for proponents of natural law
to explain how they go about the task of reasoning about morality. But
should we all do our ethics that way? Suppose two people agree that a
principle of social ethics is that society ought to maximize liberty,
equality, and the common good consistent with the constraint each of
these mandates puts on the others. [1] One party declares this to be a
principle of natural law known to reason. The other party thinks reason
is too infected with finitude and sin to be a reliable guide but
affirms the stated principle to be an implication of biblical
revelation. For explanatory, confessional, and comparative purposes,
each might usefully elucidate the rationale for preferring reason or
revelation as the source of moral truth. But the fact that they agree
on the principle is the crucial point, not how they arrive at it. They
would do well to work together to achieve the ideal in some actual
society and to spend little time arguing over whether natural law is a
legitimate basis for it or only divine self-disclosure. And will they
not jointly oppose those with contrary views whether their opponents
claim revelation or reason or both as their authorization?
I do not doubt the universality and objectivity of moral truth. That is
part of the inventory of my own moral perspective, which in part and in
whole is acknowledged to be thoroughly relative to my own ways of
discovering and testing convictions. In my moral reasoning the intent
is to discover patterns of obligation in the structure of things. The
problem is that I can never be sure that there is such a structure or
that I have rightly defined it. My skepticism about the natural law
tradition rests on the lack of certainty about the content of moral
truth. At least I am skeptical of any alleged certainty. Do I know for
sure that my skepticism is warranted? Well, I am skeptical about that
too. The point is that all these questions are unresolvable except in
somebody's mind. Absoluteness of subjective confidence in a belief is,
of course, no guarantee that it corresponds to reality. This inability
to cross the line between subjective belief and objective knowledge
defines the human predicament in relation to morality and religion. The
best we can say about our beliefs is that we are presently unavoidably
convinced of them and will act upon them and oppose contrary views and
actions in every way that is appropriate and proportional to the
seriousness of the issue at hand. I have argued elsewhere that this
kind of skepticism, relativism, and pragmatism does not undermine
strength of commitment or the courage and capacity to act passionately
in accordance with our convictions. See Relativism and Ethics .
What do the proponents of natural law do when confronted with other
competent and honest seekers of the law of nature who stubbornly and
radically disagree with them? So far as I can tell no satisfactory
resolution of this problem is available that does not weaken the claims
made about natural law. What are the options? (1) One can pronounce
opponents to be just plain wrong. The spectacle of two absolutists
declaring each other to be in error is not edifying. What is the
practical point of maintaining the objectivity and universality of
natural law known by reason if we are all the time arguing with each
other about its content? One might reply that we do so in order to come
to a better understanding of it. But how do we know when we have? The
best we can say is that once we believed A but now we believe B. The
premises of natural law theory lead us to expect that it yields true
belief, but it offers no way for us to know for sure that we have
achieved it. (2) One can relativise all claims about the content of
natural law. But to the extent that one does, the claims to
universality and objectivity are vitiated. In either case the
disputants can engage each other with indeterminate possibilities that
one will convert the other or that both will undergo a change of mind.
This is well and good, and such debates ought to occur with mutual
respect and openness to genuine conversion. But the agreement that is
or is not achieved is the decisive practical point, not the claim that
the norms we espouse are grounded in natural law.
This approach is not centered in the outright, unqualified denial
either (1) of the reality of natural law as such or (2) of the
correctness of claims about its content in particular instances but in
skepticism about the capacity of reason to possess such knowledge with
certainty. Hence, the problem lies not so much in the fact that reason
can never grasp universal, objective principles embedded in the
structure of reality itself but in knowing for sure whether it can and
when it has done so. Since we cannot have indisputable knowledge either
that reason has the general capacity to discern the law of nature or
that we have correctly read its features in particular cases, we are
left in the predicament of not knowing for sure whether we are dealing
with knowledge or with belief. Our alternatives are to absolutize one
interpretation (usually our own) or to relativise them all. In either
case in practical terms we have a plurality of contending parties who
must decide what they will do with each other. The worthwhile task is
to seek agreement where possible and to forego definitive resolution of
the theoretical impasse between the absolutists and the relativists.
This dilemma calls for a different approach to the whole problem. My
suggestion is that we simply set forth our own beliefs and the
justification for them as confessions of belief regarding how it seems
to us from where we stand.
I can affirm my sincere belief that mechanical or chemical means of
birth control are morally permissible. What I cannot do is to say for
sure that this belief corresponds with a pattern existing in the
structure of reality itself. The line between belief and knowledge
cannot be crossed with certainty on such matters. Perhaps it is
actually true that natural law permits any means of birth control that
are safe and effective. My point is that we cannot know for sure
whether it does or not. Debates between orthodox Roman Catholics and
liberal Protestants are resolvable only in the minds of the respective
interpreters making use of the principles that for them justify such
assertions. We can and must act as if our beliefs were true when
important issues are at stake. We can do so in humility with all
appropriate fervor and with effective actions proportional to the
importance of the question in dispute.
Hence, my skepticism and relativism lead me to forego correspondence
theories of truth. I prefer a pragmatism that claims only that my views
are in conformity with the best available interpretations of morality
available to me. They are useful in guiding my choices toward
satisfactory outcomes as I judge them. Moreover, I am ever open to
changes dictated by future experimental testing and further reflection.
Theoretical debates about natural law are not resolvable in ways that
command universal assent. Centuries of experience should teach us this.
Hence, I seek theories and practices that deal practically with the
fact of agreement and disagreement among moralists. Let each party
confess as historical beings whose views are relative to time and place
how they came to believe as they do. Let them offer justification of
their convictions from within their own reasoning stance. Let them
engage in critical dialogue with mutual respect and openness to being
converted by the other. Beyond that let the contending factions form
alliances with those who agree with them and engage in the good fight
for justice. Let them oppose their enemies in all appropriate ways,
respecting their humanity while resisting their beliefs and their
practices in the every relevant arena of human activity, including
politics. It is of very little practical use to engage in theoretical
arguments over which views, if any, are in harmony with the law of
nature, the will of God, or the structure of reality. As a confessional
stance, natural law is a legitimate way to interpret the foundation and
content of moral ideals and obligations. This tradition is needed to
counter the kind of relativism, skepticism, and pragmatism I espouse.
But its claims to universality and objectivity flounder on the rocks of
historical relativity. It exists as one of a plurality of paths to
truth, goodness, and beauty. The fact of unconquerable diversity in
moral belief and practice leaves us with the urgent and inescapable
practical problem of believing what we cannot deny while loving and yet
opposing those think us to be in error and a threat to the common good.
At the same time we can rejoice in the agreement that does exist and
join with those who carry the same banners in the arduous task of
making real our shared vision of justice and the good life for all.
I invite comments, questions, and refutations.
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My E-Mail Address
This essay is one of a series of essays on theological and
ethical
topics. A complete list of topics can be found on my Home Page:
Theological Essays
Presently, the following additional essays are available:
About the Author
A List of my Books
What I Believe
Interpreting the Bible Today
The Authority of the Bible
Using the Bible with Integrity
Ways of Acquiring Moral Truth
Natural Law and Moral Relativism
What is Truth -- and Does it Matter?
A Doctrine of God
Hints Toward a Doctrine of God
Trinity: God, Christ, Spirit
God as Masculine and Feminine
Theodicy: the Problem of Evil
Theodicy: A Heterodox Alternative
The Many Faces of Evil
Christ and Christians
A Critique of Niebuhr's Christ and Culture
The Incompatibility of Christianity and
Civilization
Christian Ethics
Process Christian Ethics
The Ethics of Belief
Relativism, Morality, Belief
Capital Punishment
Physician Assisted Suicide
Bioethical Decision-Making
Prostitution
Abortion
Drug Policy
Homosexuality
Theology and Ecology
Religion and Politics
Science and Theology
Church and State
A Short Biographical Sketch
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Created: Tuesday, August 25, 1998, 11:14 AM.